Tommy: as a Sapolsky-level determinist, I really appreciate this and agree with most of it. The world would be better if more people adopted your view.
My specific problem is with labeling our feelings of authorship / agency / conscious deliberation as "free will." (I understand the practical arguments for doing so.) That phrase, as commonly understood, necessarily implies a cause-less cause, a contra-causal freedom - something more than the laws of physics.
That is where the problems come in. Assuming, after the fact, that people could have done differently gives justification to "justice," blame, vengeance, retribution and retaliatory punishment, and the general sense of "just desert" / "people get what they deserve."
We can try to create the best possible system and incentives for learning so people can live their best possible life. But that doesn't mean people who "fall short" have "failed" and are "bad" and deserve to suffer.
Sapolsky-level determinism allows for teaching and incentives and protective judgment - actually a better, more realistic system, since we wouldn't base anything on "just use your willpower or you're a bad person."
At least as importantly, I think, hard determinism offers everyone compassion based on the simple fact that, given their genetics and environment, they couldn't have done otherwise at that moment.
> That phrase, as commonly understood, necessarily implies a cause-less cause, a contra-causal freedom - something more than the laws of physics.
I agree this is a "common understanding", but I disagree that it's a majority understanding either among experts (hence the philpapers survey) or lay people (hence the x-phi results). But that's a semantic squabble -- if there was critical mass to simply do away with the term "free will" in favor of other language, I would be happy to go along.
> Assuming, after the fact, that people could have done differently gives justification to "justice," blame, vengeance, retribution and retaliatory punishment
I partially agree. I agree that if someone was "just along for the ride" it feels obviously wrong to hurt them. But that doesn't justify retribution if we say they made an active choice. I'm happy to say my kids make choices freely all the time and in each case "could have done differently", and when I give them a time-out, it isn't retribution, it's for a variety of practical and pedagogical reasons. Even if contra-causal free will was true, I don't see how it justifies retribution. Retribution just doesn't seem to me like an easy thing to justify no matter what.
> hard determinism offers everyone compassion based on the simple fact that, given their genetics and environment, they couldn't have done otherwise at that moment.
I'm broadly in agreement with you (except the "couldn't have done otherwise at that moment" part -- to invoke David Lewis, this isn't how we use language when talking about other abilities, so I think it's totally fine to say people could have acted differently even if they can't in some very specific sense). I think part of the thing here is what we want to emphasize: On the one hand we can emphasize a concept of responsibility so we can use praise/blame/punishment/reward as incentives, as you say. Laws are good! Having a concept of what makes someone responsible (e.g. they are responsive to reasons in the right way) is important for our ability to function as a society.
Or we can emphasize the factors that lead someone to act a certain way. I think what we advocate emphasizing through which concept of "free will" we adopt depends on some pretty speculative reasoning about psychological/sociological factors. Funny enough, the effects of free will belief on both increasing punishment and behaving immorally have been studied, and (after some early replication failures and a bunch more studies) my read is that mostly the results show you can push around free will beliefs and it doesn't impact anything. So my guess is this actually ends up not mattering that much for either the retribution reflex or feelings of responsibility, at least in the population at large.
>my read is that mostly the results show you can push around free will beliefs and it doesn't impact anything
I don't know, but my take is that this is because it it nearly impossible to actually and truly internalize determinism. I've "been" a determinist for many years, but I struggle with it literally every day. Just last night, a post from someone I generally respect really upset me. I could rationally say that they could not have done any differently, and that my upset was only making my life worse, etc. Yet I still "chose" to be upset.
From a personal perspective (setting policy aside) I think:
We’ve evolved a powerful sense of self-agency that is for all intents and purposes impossible to override consistently. “We” are within this deterministic system so that should be expected. We can design social systems to see it though as per Caruso.
In her book, The Things We Never Say, Elizabeth Stroudt’s main character Artie is obsessed with the question of free will. Later in his life, he will discover that his now adult son has a deep fascination with free will as well.
In his remarkably impactful guidebook, Contemplation, Richard Rudd notes that our “will” is actually found in both pausing and pivoting. The simple will to think about the outcome that would serve both us and others better — a crisp, clear way to tell us to Look Before We Leap. Free will is being willing to consider our impact and chose how we respond.
Trouble is free will isn't that. We all know it's about being able to choose what we don't choose. The wrongdoer didn't have to select that option. If you're not talking about that then you're not talking about free will.
> The trouble is, this thinking requires us to make ourselves very small. If you think your decisions or intentions arising from the organization of your brain means they haven’t arisen from you, you’re saying you don’t see the organization of your brain as you.
I won’t claim to know enough about this to choose a label for myself, but I’m not terribly uncomfortable with making myself small. I suspect, on average, we take too much credit for both our hits and misses. When I consider my inherited biology, circumstance, history, current state of mind, drives, etc. when faced with an apparent choice, I can see how my sense of freedom to do differently than I end up doing might be overblown. This doesn’t make praise or blame meaningless, as you rightly point out. And it doesn’t absolve us of our mistakes. If being small offers any insights at all, they’re probably more of the “there but for the grace of God” variety.
Most of the time I don't cause my desires or aversions, I just detect them. And if I act on them, I am not really being free, it seems to me.
Say I detect a motivating emotion but hold myself back from acting on it, and rationally think about it and decide what the best action(s) would be, and then act based on my reasoning, I am tempted to think I have practiced free will. But when I analyze that whole process carefully, I realize that my rational process almost always involves weighing two or sometimes more motivating emotions against each other (e.g. if a bolt of anger initially makes me want to snap at someone, but I hold myself back and act more judiciously, that is usually because I have another desire to be the sort of person who acts judiciously). And since all the motivating emotions at play in that scenario are not chosen by me (at least in the moment) but just recognized as coming from within to be detected by my conscious mind, again it seems there is not real freedom in the whole process.
But what if I detect a motivating emotion several times under different circumstances, and decide (based on another detection of a motivating emotion) that I need to work on myself to mold or change the disagreeable motivating emotion, and do this consistently over a period of time, struggling with myself to feel differently, and after usually a period of weeks the motivating emotion in question weakens or changes, that does seem like an exercise of free will. But I suspect if I were able to analyze what happens every time I struggle, analyze what is motivating me to continue the struggle, it still comes down to a motivating emotion that simply manifests from within (e.g. I WANT to be a person who works on himself to transform disagreeable or inappropriate motivating emotions).
And then there's the idea of consciousness as an emergent process riding on top of neuronal processing of brains. So while the neurons process deterministically (or possibly randomly sometimes) according to the laws of physics, the emergent process of consciousness riding on top of them allows for free choices. Sounds good to me, but there's an awful lot of handwaving in it.
In the end, I suspect it's impossible for humans to know definitively whether we have a degree of compatibilist free will or not. I intend to pretend that I do.
What you're describing -- that there is always some different struggle between competing motivations -- is consistent with compatibilist free will. Some (like Harry Frankfurt) would say the sorts of "second-order" motivations you're talking about are really the defining part. We don't act according to simplistic if->then rules, we have much more complex abilities to think about and reason about what we're doing, without there needing to be spooky emergence. What's important is that we can respond to reasons, and our decisions and actions spring from some part of ourselves (of which our desires and aversions are a part)
If quantum mechanics as currently understood by most physicists is true (which means true randomness exists), then we know the universe is not deterministic. It would be impossible, in other words, to do the Laplace thing of calculating all future states of the universe if we knew the complete state of the universe at one moment (if that even makes sense given relativistic notions of simultaneity). But say a version of quantum mechanics is verified that eliminates randomness (like the David Bohm interpretation). Then would the Laplacian calculation imply that the universe's future, down to the smallest level of detail, can accurately be predicted? And would this mean that every one of my decisions is determined, however free and complex and deliberative they might seem? I'm not asking you to answer that (unless you want to), but it makes me doubt we can ever know for sure whether the universe is deterministic, so in the end, I don't think we really can know whether we have true freedom or not. But the compatibilist notion of freedom does seem to make very good sense. And I have certainly made many deliberative decisions in my life that have gone against some very strong desires and aversions. And I've changed and molded my desires and aversions by bringing reason to bear on them. (Some people I know would say I've done a disservice to myself by doing that).
> it makes me doubt we can ever know for sure whether the universe is deterministic, so in the end, I don't think we really can know whether we have true freedom or not.
I wouldn't reach for this as "true freedom"! I don't think it matters too much if there is true randomness or not -- whether the antecedent causes of my actions are physical effects or randomness is besides the point, I want the proximal cause to be something I identify as me!
I struggle to understand what determinists mean when they say they ‘should’ do something. For example, from the article.
> Hard determinists like Robert Sapolsky or Gregg Caruso might reply that the folk concept is also tied up with notions like retribution, which is hard to justify, and **therefore we should throw the concept out**.
Where is this idea of **should** coming from? If determinism requires them to do it, why are they trying to **justify it** and why argue that we **should do it**? Why do they have a choice?
Yes, I often think of the common argument/warning of the form "Don't argue with him, you won't change his mind [his mind is already made up etc.]" This is clearly parallel to the argument "No use punishing him, he can't do otherwise" or the like. So do hard determinists not see the parallel? Do they have some reason to deny the parallel? Do they just admit the parallel?
If they admit the parallel it seems like as you say all notions of "should" go out the window. Just as our practice of punishment stops making sense so does our practice of making reasoned arguments. In which case why do they continue to make reasoned arguments in the usual manner? The whole thing is a muddle.
If they don't admit the parallel why not the form of the arguments seem quite close.
I'd tend to think what the parallel illustrates is that the usual argument about not doing otherwise is not just about moral responsibility for purely punitive retribution (with no intent to rehabilitate or restrain malefactors), but also about appropriate responsiveness, about ability to respond to incentives, disincentives, rational arguments and calculations and so on.
The hard determinist is presumably arguing implicitly or explicitly that there are two notions of "should". One about pure retribution and one about appropriate responsiveness, they deny the first notion of "should" and retain the second notion and so their linguistic practice makes sense.
I just don't think the two proposed senses of "should" are that separable. Although I don't think pure retribution makes sense beyond a certain minimum so the practical consequences of my position are not much different.
it's a forward-looking consideration. on the version of determinism they share, determinism only ‘requires’ (a better word is necessitates imo) the thing that actually happens. looking forward, we don't know what’ll actually happen, but we may think that using ‘should’ is a factor that’ll influence the person as part of the causal factors necessitating what’ll happen.
what wouldn't make sense for a determinist is to say that something actual shouldn't be.
it sounds like you may be mixing determinism with a weird kind of fatalism where there are pre-fixed outcomes that will happen regardless of whatever else happens. but that's just an incoherent version of fatalism/determinism no one actually holds.
they only argue that we don’t have free choice. they don’t wanna eliminate ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ — they are useful words for distinguishing certain behaviors from eg. sneezing or reflex reactions, as more complex control mechanisms, but which are nevertheless not free and not fundamentally distinct in kind from any other event.
This is beside the point; but a computer programmer has made a custom communication device for his artistic son. It has helped him a lot in communicating his needs and opinions. I think you'll find the saga enjoyable
I've understood "free will" to be a measure of agency, a possibility of moving in a direction other than the path of least resistance. This human agency differs from acting strictly on genetic coding or instinct. It's also different from simply doing what you're told to do, either by a single authority figure or a culture acting as a scaled-up authority.
I don't take "free will" to mean that a person operates with zero influences on his/her behavior. Influences are everywhere, and seemingly everything a person does is done in the midst of competing influences. I think humans can have this kind of "free will," where we clearly have influences on our behavior but don't always act according to the path of least resistance. There seems to be too much variation in human choices, even by people who are in very similar environments, to dismiss at least some level of this kind of free-will agency.
What would that make my views, within your framework of categories?
It depends a bit on how you flesh things out! If the universe was rewound and you did things the exact same way (because all of your reasons for acting were the exact same), would that feel like it undermined free will? Or would it remain because the actions are still coming from you?
If the rewind -> act the same seems to undermine your idea of free will, that's libertarian. If, because the actions still come from you, you still have free will, that's compatibilist
to clarify, what's the difference between ‘the actions coming from you’ and ‘the actions partly are you’? i think the former implies magic, and the latter does not. naturalism implies that, since you are entirely of nature, not apart from it, actions aren’t special kinds of events that come from you, but are the same (only) kind of events that everything else is, only they happen through you; reality here is occurring as you. you are not making reality happen as some special agent freely controlling worldly contingency, reality is simply happening through you, as you.
apart from this, it’s not clear how you reason for otherwise-doing or contingency? compatibilists accept determinism, which entails that only ever one thing can happen. put fancily; a proposition fully describing an event is entailed by a proposition fully describing any hypersurface of that event’s past lightcone. there’s a fixed array of events and that's it! where contingency? where otherwise-doing ability given determinism?
i’m not even sure what use is the ‘wind back the universe & let it roll again’ situation here, since it’s not motivated by modern physics at all that the universe ‘is unfolding’. the least speculative-storytelling account that most closely adheres to physics imho is an acausal necessitarian account of there just being this fixed array of states of affairs. but in any case, if it’s not how this works, it’s still unclear what exactly is supposed to be free on determinism?
Good article explaining the different theories of causation in the free will debate.
To me, the most important part of the free will debate is about explaining the causation, not whether there was any. I don’t think an individual’s fallible reasoning, even of one’s own choices, disproves the idea that they freely chose.
How did the bronze Winston Churchill statute appear in London? Can you explain its appearance without including creative choices people made? Of course not. Even if we followed each individual piece of causation, our explanation for the outcome of the statue appearing in Parliament Square wouldn’t be understood by the chain of causation alone—much less one not involving people’s ability to create new alternatives.
I think it’s the laws of physics (which are deterministic) that allows for our ability to create new choices, in which case they couldn’t have just been determined from initial causations. At the same time, those physics limits the physical instantiation of that creativity. Ironically, we can create ideas that aren’t able to be physically instantiated (like in science fiction).
All that points to a lower level of deterministic causations and a higher level of explanatory knowledge—ideas that can literally change the physical world (like the statue).
Human exceptionalism is responsible for much confusion here too. Reflexive self-consciousness, abstraction, and complex language can lead to judging our agency substantially different from other life. There are some higher mammals which exhibit some sense of self, and that should temper our hubris.
I'm a hard determinist with compatibilist sympathies. I had a three way with Dan Dennett and Massimo Pigliucci a couple of years ago in which I think I stimulated Pigliucci to swing my way. Dennett held fast. This year I realized that a better term is "will free of physical causation." As no ghost in the machine has yet been confirmed with shareable evidence, ( no disembodied mind, soul, or ?? ) a Nobel Prize awaits anyone presenting evidence to the contrary!
Heredity (not just genes), and the embodied cumulative effects of experiences since conception of sperm/egg are inescapable. When one encounters the present (largely unpredictable in open, complex systems) the result is determined by the combination. With infinite, boundless reality, what we don't know is infinite, but that doesn't negate causation as operative. We simply can't always know the causes.
Outstanding. An additional thing to consider: perhaps the framing of the source of agency as unitary is part of what leads to the paradoxes or contradictions. Our cognition isn't unitary, there are components, some of which are completely opaque to consciousness. Perhaps "free will", or the perception of agency, is the byproduct of this collaboration.
So, complicated cat is complicated? 🐈 Inside or outside a box?
Maybe I missed it, but there's a feedback loop of our internal constellation of systems affecting one another in real-time and over time. It's a mistaken, naive perspective to think we're composed of a singular neural network, even without considering the neurons outside the cranium. We can't even be consciously aware of most of them most of the time. One such network trying to maintain its homeostasis will necessarily disrupt others, even without considering truly external inputs to the superposition of component systems of a single human.
Tommy this is a wonderful article. I have struggled with the concept of Free Will since I discovered Robert Sapolsky in a Bucharest bookstore in 2024. It's troubling to realize that we lack free will.
After a deep philosophical plunge I believe I have finally found what I think is the answer in Jungian psychology.
Basically, evolution has wired us to respond to a given situation without the necessity of free will through activation of the archetypes. If we respond to a given situation quickly it is most likely an archetypal response, which means "no free will."
Jung summarized this deterministic reality with one of his most famous maxims:
"Until you make the unconscious conscious, it will direct your life and you will call it fate."
But through individuation we can identify the various archetypes that exist within us.
This gives us the ability to recognize an unconscious urge, pause, and consciously choose a different response. When we do so we ARE exercising free will.
You wrote: "There’s a common idea that neuroscience disproves free will."
Neuroscience isn't needed to disprove free will. The essential insight occurred to Spinoza 350 years ago, which was 220 years before Santiago Ramón y Cajal first saw neurons.
“Men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined.”
I regard the dispute between determinists and compatibilists as rather trivial; it largely concerns what to do with the leftover vocabulary created by libertarians.
Consider a town that is 100% vegan. There is no butter, milk, or beef in the town, but many residents happily consume almond milk, margarine, and the Impossible Burger. There is, however, a protracted debate within the community over what to call these foods. The compatibilist vegans want to start calling almond milk "milk", margarine "butter", and the Impossible Burger "beef". After all, they say, these vegan foods play the same roles in the town cuisine that that their non-vegan counterparts used to play before the mass conversion to veganism. The "determinist" vegans want no part of the old omnivorous vocabulary and regard the words in question as an unpleasant and unnecessary reminder of the town's previous cruel exploitation of animals.
The debate is not very important, but I would side with the determinist vegans, and I am a determinist about free will. It seems to me that compatibilists want to use "free" to describe actions that are determined by mechanisms one regards as essentially oneself (one's personality or character). But one is largely not "free" to chose these mechanisms. The widespread use of the phrase "a prisoner of one's preferences" attests to this fact.
This is the "changing the subject" charge against compatibilism that the first section is about. I think the experimental philosophy and philpapers survey make it very different from the vegan analogy you're using here.
No analogy is perfect, but I think my vegan analogy is pretty good. I think it's a mistake to frame determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism as three possible answers to the same question. Either libertarian free will exists or it does not. That's a metaphysical question. If not, there is a completely different linguistic question about whether to preserve or jettison the old vocabulary concerning personal responsibility. Your survey of philosophers merely shows that most determinists are linguistically conservative. I.e, it's partly a survey about taste rather than reality. And ergo, that part is not so important.
One of your own sentences makes my case very well:
"Understanding neural mechanisms can only undermine free will if we make ourselves small and fail to recognize these mechanisms are a part of us."
Compatibilists basically want to substitute the oleo of ownership for the butter of freedom. But the mechanisms we recognize as part of us are rarely freely chosen by us but are determined by other mechanisms outside of our control. A genetic psychopath will usually identify with his lack of empathy ("empathy is for weaklings"), but it's not as if he selected the genes that left him without an empathy module. It's cases like these that make me firmly in favor of jettisoning the old vocabulary altogether.
We are mechanisms. These can be safe or dangerous, reliable or unreliable, interconnected or disjointed, repairable or not. Punishment can be regarded as a primitive attempt at repairing faulty mechanisms, akin to thumping a TV to improve its reception. We can do better. Norway is doing better.
As a retired psychiatrist none of your empirical evidence was very surprising. Freud was a strict determinist. The goal of psychoanalysis is to own one's mechanisms, even those one has gone to great lengths to disavow. As Freud put it,
"Wo Es war, soll Ich werden."
This is usually translated with unnecessary jargon as
“Where id was, there ego shall be.”
I prefer something simpler;
"Where it was, there I shall be."
Aside: You mentioned facilitated communication (FC). Do you know of the Anna Stubblefield case? It's perhaps the most extreme case of FC-induced self-deception on record. She was a philosopher professor who fell in love with an imaginary personality that she created and falsely attributed to a non-verbal client with profound intellectual and physical disabilities. She essentially catfished herself. She ultimately spent time in prison for the sexual abuse of her incompetent client. She also "helped" her client write and publish a philosophy paper. This may be the only philosopher paper whose author insists she is not the author.
The problem is the analogy begs the question. You're simply assuming one conception of free will (libertarian) is the real one, and then assuming anyone who disagrees is linguistically conservative.
I can’t agree. The two of us both disagree with libertarians about the ultimate nature of reality. You and I merely disagree about how best to talk about the reality we agree on. It’s true that your view can be traced back to Aristotle, but it’s silly to argue about the “reality” of this or that conception, when there are no factual disagreements involved. We should judge two conceptions of the same thing by their relative usefulness. Yours is no longer very useful, in my opinion.
We can see a similar dispute in arguments about morality. I am a moral anti-realist. Some of my fellow anti-realists are fictionalists who thinking holding on to moral vocabulary is a good idea. I’m a moral abolitionist. I no longer tell anyone they’re morally wrong. Instead I tell them they’re cruel, unkind, unfair, capricious, or mistaken about physical facts (e.g., if they bring up souls in a discussion of abortion).
If I am the organization of my brain, then I am my genes, my body chemistry, the environment that shaped that organization, and the concepts I happened to learn before this moment. None of those four inputs were selected by me. They were in place before any choice occurred. The choice is their output, not their author.
So yes, I am the cause of my action, in exactly the sense you describe. But that sentence has done no work for freedom. It has only confirmed that I am a node in a causal chain that was set before I arrived at it.
"Responsive to reasons" doesn't rescue this. Which reasons feel weighty to me, which I even notice, is itself downstream of the same four inputs.
I'm not a determinist either. Randomness is too strong for that. The same question asked in the morning and in the evening can produce different answers from the same person, and that difference isn't a hidden reason. It's noise.
The libertarian version of free will is incoherent, I agree. But its death doesn't make compatibilism true. Between determined and random, there's no room left for an author. There's just no free will, honestly named.
Tommy: as a Sapolsky-level determinist, I really appreciate this and agree with most of it. The world would be better if more people adopted your view.
My specific problem is with labeling our feelings of authorship / agency / conscious deliberation as "free will." (I understand the practical arguments for doing so.) That phrase, as commonly understood, necessarily implies a cause-less cause, a contra-causal freedom - something more than the laws of physics.
That is where the problems come in. Assuming, after the fact, that people could have done differently gives justification to "justice," blame, vengeance, retribution and retaliatory punishment, and the general sense of "just desert" / "people get what they deserve."
We can try to create the best possible system and incentives for learning so people can live their best possible life. But that doesn't mean people who "fall short" have "failed" and are "bad" and deserve to suffer.
Sapolsky-level determinism allows for teaching and incentives and protective judgment - actually a better, more realistic system, since we wouldn't base anything on "just use your willpower or you're a bad person."
At least as importantly, I think, hard determinism offers everyone compassion based on the simple fact that, given their genetics and environment, they couldn't have done otherwise at that moment.
Thanks, Matt! A couple of thoughts:
> That phrase, as commonly understood, necessarily implies a cause-less cause, a contra-causal freedom - something more than the laws of physics.
I agree this is a "common understanding", but I disagree that it's a majority understanding either among experts (hence the philpapers survey) or lay people (hence the x-phi results). But that's a semantic squabble -- if there was critical mass to simply do away with the term "free will" in favor of other language, I would be happy to go along.
> Assuming, after the fact, that people could have done differently gives justification to "justice," blame, vengeance, retribution and retaliatory punishment
I partially agree. I agree that if someone was "just along for the ride" it feels obviously wrong to hurt them. But that doesn't justify retribution if we say they made an active choice. I'm happy to say my kids make choices freely all the time and in each case "could have done differently", and when I give them a time-out, it isn't retribution, it's for a variety of practical and pedagogical reasons. Even if contra-causal free will was true, I don't see how it justifies retribution. Retribution just doesn't seem to me like an easy thing to justify no matter what.
> hard determinism offers everyone compassion based on the simple fact that, given their genetics and environment, they couldn't have done otherwise at that moment.
I'm broadly in agreement with you (except the "couldn't have done otherwise at that moment" part -- to invoke David Lewis, this isn't how we use language when talking about other abilities, so I think it's totally fine to say people could have acted differently even if they can't in some very specific sense). I think part of the thing here is what we want to emphasize: On the one hand we can emphasize a concept of responsibility so we can use praise/blame/punishment/reward as incentives, as you say. Laws are good! Having a concept of what makes someone responsible (e.g. they are responsive to reasons in the right way) is important for our ability to function as a society.
Or we can emphasize the factors that lead someone to act a certain way. I think what we advocate emphasizing through which concept of "free will" we adopt depends on some pretty speculative reasoning about psychological/sociological factors. Funny enough, the effects of free will belief on both increasing punishment and behaving immorally have been studied, and (after some early replication failures and a bunch more studies) my read is that mostly the results show you can push around free will beliefs and it doesn't impact anything. So my guess is this actually ends up not mattering that much for either the retribution reflex or feelings of responsibility, at least in the population at large.
TY. Great stuff.
>my read is that mostly the results show you can push around free will beliefs and it doesn't impact anything
I don't know, but my take is that this is because it it nearly impossible to actually and truly internalize determinism. I've "been" a determinist for many years, but I struggle with it literally every day. Just last night, a post from someone I generally respect really upset me. I could rationally say that they could not have done any differently, and that my upset was only making my life worse, etc. Yet I still "chose" to be upset.
From a personal perspective (setting policy aside) I think:
https://mattball.substack.com/p/enlightenment-june-2023
I don't know if that is worth your time.
We’ve evolved a powerful sense of self-agency that is for all intents and purposes impossible to override consistently. “We” are within this deterministic system so that should be expected. We can design social systems to see it though as per Caruso.
Agree! A point Sapolsky makes well. I just wish I could override it much more than I currently do. :-)
In her book, The Things We Never Say, Elizabeth Stroudt’s main character Artie is obsessed with the question of free will. Later in his life, he will discover that his now adult son has a deep fascination with free will as well.
In his remarkably impactful guidebook, Contemplation, Richard Rudd notes that our “will” is actually found in both pausing and pivoting. The simple will to think about the outcome that would serve both us and others better — a crisp, clear way to tell us to Look Before We Leap. Free will is being willing to consider our impact and chose how we respond.
Trouble is free will isn't that. We all know it's about being able to choose what we don't choose. The wrongdoer didn't have to select that option. If you're not talking about that then you're not talking about free will.
Great post.
> The trouble is, this thinking requires us to make ourselves very small. If you think your decisions or intentions arising from the organization of your brain means they haven’t arisen from you, you’re saying you don’t see the organization of your brain as you.
I won’t claim to know enough about this to choose a label for myself, but I’m not terribly uncomfortable with making myself small. I suspect, on average, we take too much credit for both our hits and misses. When I consider my inherited biology, circumstance, history, current state of mind, drives, etc. when faced with an apparent choice, I can see how my sense of freedom to do differently than I end up doing might be overblown. This doesn’t make praise or blame meaningless, as you rightly point out. And it doesn’t absolve us of our mistakes. If being small offers any insights at all, they’re probably more of the “there but for the grace of God” variety.
Most of the time I don't cause my desires or aversions, I just detect them. And if I act on them, I am not really being free, it seems to me.
Say I detect a motivating emotion but hold myself back from acting on it, and rationally think about it and decide what the best action(s) would be, and then act based on my reasoning, I am tempted to think I have practiced free will. But when I analyze that whole process carefully, I realize that my rational process almost always involves weighing two or sometimes more motivating emotions against each other (e.g. if a bolt of anger initially makes me want to snap at someone, but I hold myself back and act more judiciously, that is usually because I have another desire to be the sort of person who acts judiciously). And since all the motivating emotions at play in that scenario are not chosen by me (at least in the moment) but just recognized as coming from within to be detected by my conscious mind, again it seems there is not real freedom in the whole process.
But what if I detect a motivating emotion several times under different circumstances, and decide (based on another detection of a motivating emotion) that I need to work on myself to mold or change the disagreeable motivating emotion, and do this consistently over a period of time, struggling with myself to feel differently, and after usually a period of weeks the motivating emotion in question weakens or changes, that does seem like an exercise of free will. But I suspect if I were able to analyze what happens every time I struggle, analyze what is motivating me to continue the struggle, it still comes down to a motivating emotion that simply manifests from within (e.g. I WANT to be a person who works on himself to transform disagreeable or inappropriate motivating emotions).
And then there's the idea of consciousness as an emergent process riding on top of neuronal processing of brains. So while the neurons process deterministically (or possibly randomly sometimes) according to the laws of physics, the emergent process of consciousness riding on top of them allows for free choices. Sounds good to me, but there's an awful lot of handwaving in it.
In the end, I suspect it's impossible for humans to know definitively whether we have a degree of compatibilist free will or not. I intend to pretend that I do.
What you're describing -- that there is always some different struggle between competing motivations -- is consistent with compatibilist free will. Some (like Harry Frankfurt) would say the sorts of "second-order" motivations you're talking about are really the defining part. We don't act according to simplistic if->then rules, we have much more complex abilities to think about and reason about what we're doing, without there needing to be spooky emergence. What's important is that we can respond to reasons, and our decisions and actions spring from some part of ourselves (of which our desires and aversions are a part)
If quantum mechanics as currently understood by most physicists is true (which means true randomness exists), then we know the universe is not deterministic. It would be impossible, in other words, to do the Laplace thing of calculating all future states of the universe if we knew the complete state of the universe at one moment (if that even makes sense given relativistic notions of simultaneity). But say a version of quantum mechanics is verified that eliminates randomness (like the David Bohm interpretation). Then would the Laplacian calculation imply that the universe's future, down to the smallest level of detail, can accurately be predicted? And would this mean that every one of my decisions is determined, however free and complex and deliberative they might seem? I'm not asking you to answer that (unless you want to), but it makes me doubt we can ever know for sure whether the universe is deterministic, so in the end, I don't think we really can know whether we have true freedom or not. But the compatibilist notion of freedom does seem to make very good sense. And I have certainly made many deliberative decisions in my life that have gone against some very strong desires and aversions. And I've changed and molded my desires and aversions by bringing reason to bear on them. (Some people I know would say I've done a disservice to myself by doing that).
> it makes me doubt we can ever know for sure whether the universe is deterministic, so in the end, I don't think we really can know whether we have true freedom or not.
I wouldn't reach for this as "true freedom"! I don't think it matters too much if there is true randomness or not -- whether the antecedent causes of my actions are physical effects or randomness is besides the point, I want the proximal cause to be something I identify as me!
I struggle to understand what determinists mean when they say they ‘should’ do something. For example, from the article.
> Hard determinists like Robert Sapolsky or Gregg Caruso might reply that the folk concept is also tied up with notions like retribution, which is hard to justify, and **therefore we should throw the concept out**.
Where is this idea of **should** coming from? If determinism requires them to do it, why are they trying to **justify it** and why argue that we **should do it**? Why do they have a choice?
Help please!
I think it’s because they don’t deny the effectiveness of incentives including the applied social technology of moral and ethical judgement.
Yes, I often think of the common argument/warning of the form "Don't argue with him, you won't change his mind [his mind is already made up etc.]" This is clearly parallel to the argument "No use punishing him, he can't do otherwise" or the like. So do hard determinists not see the parallel? Do they have some reason to deny the parallel? Do they just admit the parallel?
If they admit the parallel it seems like as you say all notions of "should" go out the window. Just as our practice of punishment stops making sense so does our practice of making reasoned arguments. In which case why do they continue to make reasoned arguments in the usual manner? The whole thing is a muddle.
If they don't admit the parallel why not the form of the arguments seem quite close.
I'd tend to think what the parallel illustrates is that the usual argument about not doing otherwise is not just about moral responsibility for purely punitive retribution (with no intent to rehabilitate or restrain malefactors), but also about appropriate responsiveness, about ability to respond to incentives, disincentives, rational arguments and calculations and so on.
The hard determinist is presumably arguing implicitly or explicitly that there are two notions of "should". One about pure retribution and one about appropriate responsiveness, they deny the first notion of "should" and retain the second notion and so their linguistic practice makes sense.
I just don't think the two proposed senses of "should" are that separable. Although I don't think pure retribution makes sense beyond a certain minimum so the practical consequences of my position are not much different.
it's a forward-looking consideration. on the version of determinism they share, determinism only ‘requires’ (a better word is necessitates imo) the thing that actually happens. looking forward, we don't know what’ll actually happen, but we may think that using ‘should’ is a factor that’ll influence the person as part of the causal factors necessitating what’ll happen.
what wouldn't make sense for a determinist is to say that something actual shouldn't be.
it sounds like you may be mixing determinism with a weird kind of fatalism where there are pre-fixed outcomes that will happen regardless of whatever else happens. but that's just an incoherent version of fatalism/determinism no one actually holds.
they only argue that we don’t have free choice. they don’t wanna eliminate ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ — they are useful words for distinguishing certain behaviors from eg. sneezing or reflex reactions, as more complex control mechanisms, but which are nevertheless not free and not fundamentally distinct in kind from any other event.
I enjoyed your post.
This is beside the point; but a computer programmer has made a custom communication device for his artistic son. It has helped him a lot in communicating his needs and opinions. I think you'll find the saga enjoyable
https://extelligence.substack.com/p/i-accidentally-started-a-small-business
https://extelligence.substack.com/p/mama-look-a-white-dove
Free will is real. Our story about why we acted is the part that can be wrong.
Very thoughtful survey of the topic!
I've understood "free will" to be a measure of agency, a possibility of moving in a direction other than the path of least resistance. This human agency differs from acting strictly on genetic coding or instinct. It's also different from simply doing what you're told to do, either by a single authority figure or a culture acting as a scaled-up authority.
I don't take "free will" to mean that a person operates with zero influences on his/her behavior. Influences are everywhere, and seemingly everything a person does is done in the midst of competing influences. I think humans can have this kind of "free will," where we clearly have influences on our behavior but don't always act according to the path of least resistance. There seems to be too much variation in human choices, even by people who are in very similar environments, to dismiss at least some level of this kind of free-will agency.
What would that make my views, within your framework of categories?
It depends a bit on how you flesh things out! If the universe was rewound and you did things the exact same way (because all of your reasons for acting were the exact same), would that feel like it undermined free will? Or would it remain because the actions are still coming from you?
If the rewind -> act the same seems to undermine your idea of free will, that's libertarian. If, because the actions still come from you, you still have free will, that's compatibilist
to clarify, what's the difference between ‘the actions coming from you’ and ‘the actions partly are you’? i think the former implies magic, and the latter does not. naturalism implies that, since you are entirely of nature, not apart from it, actions aren’t special kinds of events that come from you, but are the same (only) kind of events that everything else is, only they happen through you; reality here is occurring as you. you are not making reality happen as some special agent freely controlling worldly contingency, reality is simply happening through you, as you.
apart from this, it’s not clear how you reason for otherwise-doing or contingency? compatibilists accept determinism, which entails that only ever one thing can happen. put fancily; a proposition fully describing an event is entailed by a proposition fully describing any hypersurface of that event’s past lightcone. there’s a fixed array of events and that's it! where contingency? where otherwise-doing ability given determinism?
i’m not even sure what use is the ‘wind back the universe & let it roll again’ situation here, since it’s not motivated by modern physics at all that the universe ‘is unfolding’. the least speculative-storytelling account that most closely adheres to physics imho is an acausal necessitarian account of there just being this fixed array of states of affairs. but in any case, if it’s not how this works, it’s still unclear what exactly is supposed to be free on determinism?
Good article explaining the different theories of causation in the free will debate.
To me, the most important part of the free will debate is about explaining the causation, not whether there was any. I don’t think an individual’s fallible reasoning, even of one’s own choices, disproves the idea that they freely chose.
How did the bronze Winston Churchill statute appear in London? Can you explain its appearance without including creative choices people made? Of course not. Even if we followed each individual piece of causation, our explanation for the outcome of the statue appearing in Parliament Square wouldn’t be understood by the chain of causation alone—much less one not involving people’s ability to create new alternatives.
I think it’s the laws of physics (which are deterministic) that allows for our ability to create new choices, in which case they couldn’t have just been determined from initial causations. At the same time, those physics limits the physical instantiation of that creativity. Ironically, we can create ideas that aren’t able to be physically instantiated (like in science fiction).
All that points to a lower level of deterministic causations and a higher level of explanatory knowledge—ideas that can literally change the physical world (like the statue).
Excellent piece, Tommy! Besides Sapolsky and Caruso, see Galen Strawson here: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/strawsong/
Human exceptionalism is responsible for much confusion here too. Reflexive self-consciousness, abstraction, and complex language can lead to judging our agency substantially different from other life. There are some higher mammals which exhibit some sense of self, and that should temper our hubris.
I'm a hard determinist with compatibilist sympathies. I had a three way with Dan Dennett and Massimo Pigliucci a couple of years ago in which I think I stimulated Pigliucci to swing my way. Dennett held fast. This year I realized that a better term is "will free of physical causation." As no ghost in the machine has yet been confirmed with shareable evidence, ( no disembodied mind, soul, or ?? ) a Nobel Prize awaits anyone presenting evidence to the contrary!
Heredity (not just genes), and the embodied cumulative effects of experiences since conception of sperm/egg are inescapable. When one encounters the present (largely unpredictable in open, complex systems) the result is determined by the combination. With infinite, boundless reality, what we don't know is infinite, but that doesn't negate causation as operative. We simply can't always know the causes.
Outstanding. An additional thing to consider: perhaps the framing of the source of agency as unitary is part of what leads to the paradoxes or contradictions. Our cognition isn't unitary, there are components, some of which are completely opaque to consciousness. Perhaps "free will", or the perception of agency, is the byproduct of this collaboration.
So, complicated cat is complicated? 🐈 Inside or outside a box?
Maybe I missed it, but there's a feedback loop of our internal constellation of systems affecting one another in real-time and over time. It's a mistaken, naive perspective to think we're composed of a singular neural network, even without considering the neurons outside the cranium. We can't even be consciously aware of most of them most of the time. One such network trying to maintain its homeostasis will necessarily disrupt others, even without considering truly external inputs to the superposition of component systems of a single human.
Tommy this is a wonderful article. I have struggled with the concept of Free Will since I discovered Robert Sapolsky in a Bucharest bookstore in 2024. It's troubling to realize that we lack free will.
After a deep philosophical plunge I believe I have finally found what I think is the answer in Jungian psychology.
Basically, evolution has wired us to respond to a given situation without the necessity of free will through activation of the archetypes. If we respond to a given situation quickly it is most likely an archetypal response, which means "no free will."
Jung summarized this deterministic reality with one of his most famous maxims:
"Until you make the unconscious conscious, it will direct your life and you will call it fate."
But through individuation we can identify the various archetypes that exist within us.
This gives us the ability to recognize an unconscious urge, pause, and consciously choose a different response. When we do so we ARE exercising free will.
Thanks again for a great article.
You wrote: "There’s a common idea that neuroscience disproves free will."
Neuroscience isn't needed to disprove free will. The essential insight occurred to Spinoza 350 years ago, which was 220 years before Santiago Ramón y Cajal first saw neurons.
“Men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined.”
I regard the dispute between determinists and compatibilists as rather trivial; it largely concerns what to do with the leftover vocabulary created by libertarians.
Consider a town that is 100% vegan. There is no butter, milk, or beef in the town, but many residents happily consume almond milk, margarine, and the Impossible Burger. There is, however, a protracted debate within the community over what to call these foods. The compatibilist vegans want to start calling almond milk "milk", margarine "butter", and the Impossible Burger "beef". After all, they say, these vegan foods play the same roles in the town cuisine that that their non-vegan counterparts used to play before the mass conversion to veganism. The "determinist" vegans want no part of the old omnivorous vocabulary and regard the words in question as an unpleasant and unnecessary reminder of the town's previous cruel exploitation of animals.
The debate is not very important, but I would side with the determinist vegans, and I am a determinist about free will. It seems to me that compatibilists want to use "free" to describe actions that are determined by mechanisms one regards as essentially oneself (one's personality or character). But one is largely not "free" to chose these mechanisms. The widespread use of the phrase "a prisoner of one's preferences" attests to this fact.
This is the "changing the subject" charge against compatibilism that the first section is about. I think the experimental philosophy and philpapers survey make it very different from the vegan analogy you're using here.
No analogy is perfect, but I think my vegan analogy is pretty good. I think it's a mistake to frame determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism as three possible answers to the same question. Either libertarian free will exists or it does not. That's a metaphysical question. If not, there is a completely different linguistic question about whether to preserve or jettison the old vocabulary concerning personal responsibility. Your survey of philosophers merely shows that most determinists are linguistically conservative. I.e, it's partly a survey about taste rather than reality. And ergo, that part is not so important.
One of your own sentences makes my case very well:
"Understanding neural mechanisms can only undermine free will if we make ourselves small and fail to recognize these mechanisms are a part of us."
Compatibilists basically want to substitute the oleo of ownership for the butter of freedom. But the mechanisms we recognize as part of us are rarely freely chosen by us but are determined by other mechanisms outside of our control. A genetic psychopath will usually identify with his lack of empathy ("empathy is for weaklings"), but it's not as if he selected the genes that left him without an empathy module. It's cases like these that make me firmly in favor of jettisoning the old vocabulary altogether.
We are mechanisms. These can be safe or dangerous, reliable or unreliable, interconnected or disjointed, repairable or not. Punishment can be regarded as a primitive attempt at repairing faulty mechanisms, akin to thumping a TV to improve its reception. We can do better. Norway is doing better.
As a retired psychiatrist none of your empirical evidence was very surprising. Freud was a strict determinist. The goal of psychoanalysis is to own one's mechanisms, even those one has gone to great lengths to disavow. As Freud put it,
"Wo Es war, soll Ich werden."
This is usually translated with unnecessary jargon as
“Where id was, there ego shall be.”
I prefer something simpler;
"Where it was, there I shall be."
Aside: You mentioned facilitated communication (FC). Do you know of the Anna Stubblefield case? It's perhaps the most extreme case of FC-induced self-deception on record. She was a philosopher professor who fell in love with an imaginary personality that she created and falsely attributed to a non-verbal client with profound intellectual and physical disabilities. She essentially catfished herself. She ultimately spent time in prison for the sexual abuse of her incompetent client. She also "helped" her client write and publish a philosophy paper. This may be the only philosopher paper whose author insists she is not the author.
Here is the 2015 NYT article:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-anna-stubblefield.html
and the trailer for the excellent 2024 documentary about the case:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cTy3XMyG1Ww
The problem is the analogy begs the question. You're simply assuming one conception of free will (libertarian) is the real one, and then assuming anyone who disagrees is linguistically conservative.
I can’t agree. The two of us both disagree with libertarians about the ultimate nature of reality. You and I merely disagree about how best to talk about the reality we agree on. It’s true that your view can be traced back to Aristotle, but it’s silly to argue about the “reality” of this or that conception, when there are no factual disagreements involved. We should judge two conceptions of the same thing by their relative usefulness. Yours is no longer very useful, in my opinion.
We can see a similar dispute in arguments about morality. I am a moral anti-realist. Some of my fellow anti-realists are fictionalists who thinking holding on to moral vocabulary is a good idea. I’m a moral abolitionist. I no longer tell anyone they’re morally wrong. Instead I tell them they’re cruel, unkind, unfair, capricious, or mistaken about physical facts (e.g., if they bring up souls in a discussion of abortion).
I don't think free will exists.
If I am the organization of my brain, then I am my genes, my body chemistry, the environment that shaped that organization, and the concepts I happened to learn before this moment. None of those four inputs were selected by me. They were in place before any choice occurred. The choice is their output, not their author.
So yes, I am the cause of my action, in exactly the sense you describe. But that sentence has done no work for freedom. It has only confirmed that I am a node in a causal chain that was set before I arrived at it.
"Responsive to reasons" doesn't rescue this. Which reasons feel weighty to me, which I even notice, is itself downstream of the same four inputs.
I'm not a determinist either. Randomness is too strong for that. The same question asked in the morning and in the evening can produce different answers from the same person, and that difference isn't a hidden reason. It's noise.
The libertarian version of free will is incoherent, I agree. But its death doesn't make compatibilism true. Between determined and random, there's no room left for an author. There's just no free will, honestly named.
Ah yes the homunculus argument for compatibilism