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Silas Abrahamsen's avatar

Great post, and I agree with a lot of your reflections, and the emphasis on coherence/abduction.

But as a dualist I feel the need to criticize some of your arguments.

With regards to the interaction problem, I don't think there really is a problem there, or at least not anymore than there is a problem for the physicalist. Sure, we don't know the exact mechanism by which mental substance interacts with physical substance and vice versa, but we also don't know exactly how anything interacts with anything. If two billiard balls hit each other, you can always ask a further question of why one imparted its momentum on the other. At some point we just have to say "it just happens". It also sounds a lot less scary if you say "psychophysical laws" rather than mental substance interacting with physical substance. Just as there are laws for how physical matter interacts, there are laws for the relationship between physical and mental states.

Dualists also don't dispute that mental states have a very strong relationship to brain states. That is just obvious. But it is just not clear what the inference is from differences in physical states causing differences in mental states to mental states being physical states - there is nothing surprising about the close connection on dualism. Perhaps if you hold a very strong view where much of your personality is determined by your soul, but I don't know of many contemporary dualists who would hold to such a view - I at least wouldn't want to defend that.

As for the causal closure/conservation of energy argument, you can take two lines. One is just a non-interactionist dualism, where the soul doesn't cause any physical changes, but just supervenes on physical states. Another is just to deny conservation. After all, why should we think that conservation holds in the brain, if we have reason to think that souls can cause actions. Sure, we have observed conservation holding in many other cases, but nobody is disputing that it would hold in those cases. So pointing to cases which neither theory predicts would break causal closure is not going to provide any evidence for or against either theory.

I also think the inference from science explaining complex functional relations to science explaining consciousness is unwarranted. Sure, we can explain all sorts of structural truths in science; how such and such states relate to such and such states, and how one state causes another. But that does nothing to explain the qualitative feel of consciousness.

But again, really enjoyed your post!

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Chris Deca's avatar

Excellent post. I want to see so much more writing like this on Substack--intelligent, thought-provoking, well-written posts. And this bit: "I'm not claiming computers are minds. But computers are indisputably dumb matter and can do intelligent things. It’s really surprising what they are capable of if you think about the fact computers are just refined rock and sand." Wow. Amidst a brilliant post, for some reason, this statement really struck me!

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